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Abstract: Business groups have been described as improving the value of the affiliated firms they
control, which is often beyond the capability of standalone firms. The purpose of the current study is
to analyze the financial performance of affiliates of diversified Pakistani business groups relative to
standalone firms. The current study employs data from 284 Pakistani listed non-financial firms from
2008–2015. In order to test the hypotheses, two dependent variables are used, namely, accounting
(Return on Assets (ROA)) and stock market (Tobin’s Q) measures of performance. Specifically, this
study probes and compares the performance measures of group member and standalone firms.
The findings of the study suggest that business group memberships have statistically significant
effects on accounting and stock market measures of firm performance. In addition, size and sales
growth have an increasing effect on the performance of firms. We believe that business groups in
Pakistan are efficient economic actors and can be considered responses to high transaction costs and
market failures.
Keywords: business groups; financial performance; group-affiliated; institutional voids
1. Introduction
Due to economic liberalization and globalization, corporate firms understand the intense
competition they face: they need to diversify risk in order to achieve economies of scope and scale.
Companies have to search for new markets, leverage resources to gain a competitive edge, and intensify
the connections between firms by mergers, investments, and cross-shareholdings. One appropriate
way of achieving these goals is to form a business group. By forming a business group, the affiliated
firms use collaborative efforts between member firms to acquire favorable financial and intangible
resources and capabilities. In fact, business groups create economies of scale and scope in order to
minimize their Transaction Costs and increase the efficiencies of asset allocation. These collaborative
efforts result in the maximization of firms’ value and financial performance [1].
In the literature of business groups, a well-defined and widely accepted definition of the business
group is ‘a set of legally independent firms bound together by some formal and informal ties’ [2].
A business group is an organizational form, that is, a collection of officially declared independent firms,
and these firms work under the common financial and administrative control of certain families [3].
This study follows the definition provided by Khanna and Yafeh [4] in relation to emerging markets,
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which considers emerging markets as a ‘transactional battlefield’, where buyers and sellers do not come
together comfortably due to a lack of the specialized intermediaries in the market that generally assist
with and advise on transactions between counterparties. Rehman [5] provided an initial identification
of group membership. Previous studies have also referenced the same source to identify membership
of business groups in the context of Pakistan [6].
Furthermore, the business group is an accepted phenomenon in different countries of the world.
It is recognized under different names in many countries, for example, chaebol in Korea, keiretsu in
Japan, business houses in Indian, and the ‘twenty-two families’ of Pakistan [7]. White [8] also proposed
that the economic influence of Pakistan is concentrated in ‘the 22 families’ when considering domestic
economic issues.
The business group is an important business form that prevails in both developing and developed
countries. In a normative assumption view, group affiliation should increase the value of affiliated firms
in the context of developing countries [9]. On the other hand, based on the literature of Transaction
Cost economics, Williamson [10] and Coase [11] proposed the opposite view of group membership’s
influence on firm performance. Hence, in the case of developed countries, group affiliation outcomes
resulted in high Transaction Costs and negative corporate performance. Thus, an empirical question
arises that motivates scholars to analyze whether or not group affiliation positively affects the financial
performance of firms in emerging economies.
Accordingly, performance comparison outcomes are different in relation to standalone firms, for
example, in India, Chile, Korea, and Turkey group affiliation improves the performance of member
firms. Orbay and Yurtoglu [12] reported that, in Turkey, group affiliation can be seen to have improved
the investment performance and market value of firms. Other studies focused on Korea (Chang and
Choi [13], Chang and Hong [3]), and others on India, namely, Khanna and Palepu [14,15]. All of them
argued that business groups can be a source of value in emerging markets because they effectively
fill in the institutional voids resulting from market inefficiencies. However, the performance of
Japanese Keiretsu member firms is lower than standalone firms. Moreover, in China, business group
membership has no effect on accounting performance [16]. Most of the available literature refers
to Khanna and Rivkin [17]. Thus, in emerging economies research studies are based on the notion
that groups are widely available in countries with weak institutional control and imperfect market
conditions [18].
However, the existing literature is equivocal at best in presenting the impact of business groups
on firm performance. Thus, how business group affiliation affects financial performance in emerging
markets remains an open question. In order to fill this gap in the literature, the current study examines
the performance outcomes of business group affiliation in Pakistan. We contend that Pakistan offers
an excellent setting to test these phenomena for several reasons. Firstly, Pakistan represents an ideal
case of the co-existence of standalone firms and large business groups, both contributing significantly
to the country’s economic activities. Saeed et al. [19] documented that business groups account
for a major part of the private sector of the economy and hold a leading edge in terms of overall
economic development and political favors. In addition, since Pakistan became independent, the
owners of several business groups have migrated from India and run their businesses in Pakistan
(1947). Therefore, business groups have a long history and strong roots in the Pakistani economy.
Secondly, diversified business groups are common in most developing economies. However,
their role is poorly understood in India and Pakistan. The only exception is White [8], who
revealed a statistically insignificant difference between the profitability of group and non-group
firms. Hence, there is a pressing need to fill this research gap. The current study is amongst the first to
explore the effect of group affiliation on performance using the most recent data set of Pakistani firms.
The main contribution of this study is to show that business group membership can be an inevitable
organizational response to institutional voids which enables group-affiliated firms to grow and prosper
in an uncertain economic environment. Pakistan’s economy faces different challenges, including
energy crises, terrorism incidents, and political interference and governance issues. This situation has
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impeded Pakistan’s economic and trading activities, which has not only resulted in higher transaction
costs for the corporate sector but also caused problems in production cycles, which results in significant
delays in fulfilling export orders around the globe. Consequently, economic growth has slowed, and
demand for imports reduced, accompanied by declining tax collection and foreign direct investment.
Considering these economic conditions, it is meaningful to compare and evaluate the performance of
group-affiliated and standalone firms and find out whether business group affiliation is a panacea for
firms operating in such an economic environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses a review of the literature,
together with theoretical perspectives and empirical studies, conducted in different countries with
the objective of exploring the relationship between group affiliation and the performance of firms.
Following this, Section 3 discusses the sources of data and the criteria applied in the selection of
the sample. An appropriate methodology to investigate the relationship between variables is also
explained. Section 4 discusses the results of the study in order to answer the question of whether
group-affiliated firms are more profitable than standalone firms. Finally, Section 5 ends with a
conclusion and suggestions for future studies.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Theoretical Framework
Khanna and Palepu [20] coined the term ‘institutional voids’, and described them as the lack
of intermediaries that connect buyers and sellers for efficient economic transactions. Institutional
voids may create hurdles or certain opportunities for specific elements of the market. This provides an
alternative justification for the presence of business groups in emerging economies.
Importantly, empirical studies have emphasized that business groups offset institutional voids
by internalizing product, capital, and labor markets [21–23]. Nevertheless, when product, labor, and
capital markets suffer due to the failing of these institutions, such practices lead to high Transaction
Costs and the business group is one approach adopted in order to fill these institutional voids [14].
Considering the significance of Institutional Voids, a growing number of studies exist in the
literature, which emphasize the association between business group affiliation and the performance
outcomes of firms. Institutional voids theory suggests that prevailing voids in labor, product, and
capital markets will not affect all firms equally. Rather, such voids have a strong negative influence
on the performance of standalone firms relative to group-affiliated firms, since group-affiliated firms
receive various benefits from each other, such as loans, debt guarantees, equity investments, and
internal business trade [24]. Accordingly, it would be a rational approach for business groups to trade
internally, to respond to market failures by protecting group-member firms from unusual external
shocks to minimize risk and to increase performance.
Lee, Peng, and Lee [25] argued that during an institutional transition phase, the formal rules and
regulations change, and increasing costs and uncertainty are expected. In a meta-analysis based on
141 studies, Carney et al. [26] related business group relationship with performance in 28 countries.
They reported that the cost of group membership marginally balances its benefits in the form of
improved financial performance, and that there were performance deviations to a certain degree at the
firm and group levels.
The Transaction Cost perspective is based on the idea that firms strive to minimize the cost of
exchanging resources within the economic environment [11]. Business groups are justified on the basis
of Transaction Cost Theory by focusing on the differences at the overall level of Transaction Costs across
countries affected by institutional voids [15]. In accordance with this approach, the business group is
the right structure to deal with certain market failures that increase the overall Transaction Costs of an
economy in different areas (labor, capital, and product markets) [27]. In addition, Yiu et al. [28] argued
that the Transaction Cost approach has become a familiar viewpoint when rationalizing business
groups in developing economies.
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Consistent with the theory, if the level of Transaction Costs is high in an economy, then more
economic activities are assumed to be carried out through an internally created market, as compared
to the external market in the case of lower Transaction Costs [29]. In line with this assumption,
previous studies have shown that internal capital markets have played a key role in business
groups. Examples of this are the study by Shin and Park [30] on Korean chaebols and the study
by Hoshi et al. [31] on Japanese Keiretsu. Therefore, business groups provide an efficient framework to
capitalize investment opportunities at low transaction costs by investing in new ventures and ensuring
the efficient allocation of funds generated through the internal capital market, as well as the external
capital market.
Internal capital markets not only lower financial constraints for group-member firms, but also
keep providing capital at low interest rates with soft protective covenants. Hence, the creation of an
internal capital market lowers dependence on external market capital, which in turn strengthens their
position compared to standalone firms. Zattoni, Pedersen, and Kumar [32] took a sample of Indian
firms and observed that, in the presence of market and formal institutional imperfections, business
groups perform better financially than standalone firms. However, business groups disappoint when
it comes to confirming their superior performance when markets become more efficient.
2.2. Hypotheses Development
Business groups can be witnessed in many forms and sizes, with their diversity featuring
challenges over time. Meanwhile, proportional returns in terms of profit are recognized to a greater
degree in developing countries, where labor and financial markets are imperfect. In the comprehensive
study by Khanna and Rivkin [17] related to business group affiliation and corporate performance,
based on a sample of 14 countries, the effects of business groups were seen to differ from 4.2% (Mexico)
to 31.1% (Indonesia). Moreover, Chang and Hong [3] found that business group effects account for
between 5.7% and 9.7% of Korean firms’ performance; importantly, this effect disappeared over a long
period. In addition, the intensity of the business group effect is greater in small-sized business groups.
Comparing country-specific findings conducted in India and Korea, different strengths of the
effect of business group membership on the performance of firms were witnessed [17]. Previous study
findings, which are commonly seen as being in favor of the positive outcomes of group membership,
supported their conclusions regarding the capability of business groups to overcome institutional
voids in emerging economies. In China, it has also been concluded that the effect of group membership
is positive on firm value [33]. In addition, He et al. [16] have reported that in China, group membership
has a low and significant effect on firm accounting value.
However, Khanna and Yafeh [2] observed a negative association between group membership
and firm performance in half of the ten emerging economies in their sample. Jia et al. [34] showed
that business groups may be parasites that expropriate minority shareholders in the group, or may be
paragons that support transactions and operations in and outside of the group when facing difficult
economic and institutional environments. The equivocal impact of group membership was observed
in earlier studies, for example, Careny et al. [26], which proposed that the association between group
membership and firm performance may be more complex than has previously been empirically and
theoretically modelled. They found that the effect of group membership varies substantial among
countries: it is positive in Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Sweden, and Turkey; while it
turns negative in Nigeria, France, Japan, and South Korea; and insignificant in Belgium, China, India,
Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines. In addition, Mursitama [35] found a negative effect of business
group membership on the performance of Indonesian business groups. In addition, Ma et al. [36]
provided evidence from 1119 publicly listed Chinese firms that group membership has a statistically
significant and negative influence on firm performance. Table A1 provides a summary of these studies.
Essentially, this brief review of the literature has reported mixed findings, offering evidence for
both positive and negative associations between group membership and performance. Thus, many
opportunities exist to increase understanding of the relationship between group membership and
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financial performance through greater scrutiny when institutional voids are more severe. Consistent
with the theory, empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that firms affiliated with a group located
in an emerging economy have a higher financial performance than standalone firms. The Institutional
and Transaction Cost theories emphasize that business groups may add value to member firms by
filling the voids left by the missing institutions that support the efficient working of markets [37].
Therefore, it is expected that group membership positively affects the performance of group-affiliated
firms in Pakistan.
Hypothesis 1. Firms affiliated with business groups are more profitable than standalone firms.
Firm size is taken to represent the capacity of economies of scale and scope accumulating to large
firms. If large group-affiliated firms capitalize these two measures, the size of the firm will positively
affect the performance of firms. The size of a business group affects firm performance [15]. On the
positive side, Baumol [38] has documented that firm size positively affects the performance of firms by
arguing that the benefits of large firms derive from their market power and greater access to external
capital markets. Chu [39], in the Taiwanese context, concluded that group membership in the case of
large-sized business groups leads to better stock market performance. On the contrary, Samuels and
Smyth [40] suggested a negative relationship between firm size and profitability.
In their study, Claessens et al. [41] also used a sample of 2000 firms from nine East Asian economies,
empirically analyzing the interaction effect of group affiliation and size on the value of firms. The results
of interaction terms between group affiliation and size are statistically insignificant. Recently, scholars
have also applied the interaction effect between group affiliation and size on firm value and reported
that the interaction term has a statistically significant and positive influence on firm value [42], since
large firms receive more advantages from group membership, such as easy access to external capital
markets and greater economies of scale and scope. Therefore, we anticipated that the large size of a
firm moderates the relationship between group affiliation and financial performance.
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between group affiliation and affiliate performance is positively moderated by
the size of firms.
Hadlock and James [43] proposed that firms choose debt financing compared to equity financing,
predominantly because the owners of firms prefer the dilution of earnings to the dilution of ownership.
Therefore, this study applied indicators of leverage in order to measure the level of debt carried by a
firm to reflect the availability of capital raised [44,45]. A greater ratio of debt-to-assets increases the
chances of financial distress and bankruptcy and thus limits a firm’s capacity to financially support
its investment opportunities by borrowing [46]. Therefore, a negative sign is predicted for leverage
measures in connection with performance measures.
Hypothesis 3. The relationship between group affiliation and affiliate performance is negatively moderated by
the leverage of firms.
This study makes an initial effort to address the issue by investigating the influence of sales
growth on accounting and stock market measures of performance. We ask two questions: (i) Does sales
growth positively affect performance? (ii) Is the positive impact of sales growth on the performance
of group-affiliated firms higher or lower in case of group affiliation? Using a sample of Keiretsu
member firms, Aoki [47] reported by that group affiliation does not facilitate higher sales growth
rates. A review of the literature posits different findings, offering both positive [48–50] and negative
associations [51] between growth and profitability. Pakistani business groups focused on the sales
growth of firms, particularly when searching for new markets and moving into new business ventures.
Thus, it is expected that firms affiliated with a business group gain more from sales growth relative to
standalone firms.
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Hypothesis 4. The relationship between group affiliation and affiliate performance is positively moderated by
the sales growth of firms.
3. Data Sources and Methodology
3.1. Sources of Data
This study analyses a large sample of group-member firms and standalone firms listed on the
Pakistan Stock Exchange. Previously, the Pakistan Stock Exchange was known as the Karachi Stock
Exchange. Then, three stock exchanges, namely, the Karachi Stock Exchange, the Lahore Stock
Exchange, and the Islamabad Stock exchange, merged to become the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX),
on 11 January 2016. The sample data is collected from the State Bank of Pakistan-Financial Statements
Analysis of Companies (Non-Financial). This data is administered and published by the State Bank
of Pakistan (SBP), as the Central Bank of Pakistan. The document contains data from the financial
statements of non-financial firms and this data is comparable to the annual reports submitted to the
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). More importantly, firms in Pakistan have to
report their data to the SECP annually, thus transparency and accuracy of data is also required.
3.2. Data Collection and Sample Specification
Private limited firms have been excluded from the sample due to a lack of available data. The study
sample also excludes financial, real estate, and utility firms, and firms that are subsidiaries of foreign
firms. Financial services firms are not part of the sample since their accounting scheme is not compatible
with that of firms in other industries. The returns of financial firms are not similar and cannot be
compared with other sectors of the economy [52]. This study sample includes only public limited firms
from the private sector in Pakistan. Thus, following various studies, firms operating in the financial
services sector, firms affiliated with multinational patents, and firms that are owned partially or fully
by the government are not part of the study sample [53].
Based on these facts, the study covers 284 public limited firms listed on the Pakistan Stock
Exchange (PSX) for the period 2008–2015. The study sample consists of 284 firms, 143 (50.35%) of
which are affiliated with a business group and 141 (49.65%) of which are standalone firms. The total
numbers of observations in this study is 2272. In food and tobacco industries, out of 35 firms, 16 are
group-affiliated and 19 are standalone firms. More importantly, in the sample, 74 firms are active in
basic industries, including petroleum, of which 38 are group-affiliated firms and 36 are standalone
firms. The textile industry comprises the major share, with 1032 observations from 129 firms of which
56 are group-affiliated, and 73 are standalone firms.
3.3. Methodologies
This study is based on unbalanced panel data analyzed primarily by the pooled ordinary
squares (OLS) regression method to estimate the relationship between dependent and independent
variables. The pooled OLS regression is appropriate for examining the effect of group affiliation on
the performance of group-member firms, and there are no unique attributes of individuals within the
measurement set. In this case, group affiliation is a dummy variable.
Firstly, to compare the performance of group-member firms and standalone firms, an independent
sample t-test is applied to mean differences. Then, pooled regression is estimated to empirically
analyze the effect of group affiliation on the performance of member firms. Earlier studies related to
the performance of business groups have applied the pooled regression estimation technique at a firm
level [54–56]. The performance comparison of group firms and standalone firms is applied by using a
dummy variable; thus, a value of 1 indicates that a firm is a member of a group, while zero indicates
it is a standalone firm. Therefore, group membership is a dummy variable distinguishing between
affiliated firms and standalone firms.
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Based on the review of the literature and business group theories the main hypothesis of the study
is to investigate whether group-member firms perform better financially than standalone firms do. It is
assumed that in emerging economies business group membership positively affects the performance
of group members. The study estimates model 1 and 2 using regression analysis to explore the effect
of group membership on the financial performance of firms.
ROA i,t = βo + β1DGroupi,t + β2SIZEi + β3SGRWi,t + β4LEVi,t + β5DInd + εi (1)
Tobin′ s Qi,t = βo + β1DGroupi,t + β2SIZEi + β3SGRWi,t + β4LEVi,t + β5DInd + εi (2)
where the dependent variables are Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. ROA refers to the accounting
based performance of a firm, and measures earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets.
Tobin’s Q represents the stock market measure of firm performance, which is estimated as the market
value of equity and the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets. We used the natural
logarithm transformation of Tobin’s Q, since, the log-transformed Tobin’s Q ratio has shown better
statistical distribution properties than raw Tobin’s Q ratio [57,58]. The Group Affiliation (DGroup)
dummy is the variable of interest and is a time-invariant dummy variable, showing the membership
of firms. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. It indicates the size of the firm. Sales Growth
(SGRW) is represented by the sales growth of the firm and represents current year sales minus last
year sales divided by last year sales. Leverage (LEV) is the capital structure of a firm, that is, the total
debt divided by total assets. DInd shows each of the listed branches at a two-digit level of SIC (see
Table A2). Lastly, ε is the error term. This study introduces interactive (cross-effect) variables within
baseline models 1 and 2.
In particular, all firm-level control variables used, such as size, growth, and leverage, are interacted
with group-affiliated dummy variables to catch the group affiliation relationship. Therefore, models
5–10 analyze the interaction between group affiliation and control variables to determine their effect
on the profitability of firms. Table 1 shows the definitions of each dependent and independent variable,
with its source.
Table 1. The definitions and sources of the variables.
Variables (Acronyms) Definitions Sources
Return on Assets (ROA) Earnings before interest and taxes divided bytotal assets
Financial Statement
Analysis (SBP)
Tobin’s Q Market value of equity plus book value of debtdivided by total assets
Pakistan Stock
Exchange (PSX)
Group Affiliation
(DGroup)
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is
affiliated with a Pakistani business group,
0 otherwise
Rehman (2016) [5]
Leverage (LEV) Total debt divided by total assets Financial StatementAnalysis (SBP)
Firm Size (SIZE) Natural Logarithm of total assets Financial StatementAnalysis (SBP)
Sales Growth (SGRW) (Current year sales + Last year sales) divided byLast year sales
Financial Statement
Analysis (SBP)
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4. Analysis and Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
The t-test statistics are used to analyze the differences in the means of group member and
standalone firms’ performance and control variables. It can be seen that group-affiliated firms have
a significantly higher Return on Assets with a mean value of 5.008 than standalone firms with 1.663.
The second performance factor is measured by Tobin’s Q, which is used to estimate the market
performance of firms. Group-member firms appear to have higher Tobin’s Q ratios, with a mean
value of 4.132, than standalone firms with 3.467. The comparison of performance measures between
group-member firms and standalone firms is shown in Table 2.
Consequently, it is hypothesized that member firms are more profitable than standalone firms.
In particular, the results of the t-test indicate that group firms are significantly more profitable in terms
of accounting performance (ROA) and stock market performance (Tobin’s Q) than standalone firms.
Thus, it is suggested that group affiliation improves member firms’ profitability. The performance
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. It can also be seen that group-affiliated firms are
larger than standalone firms; as measured by total assets, the difference is statistically significant at the
1% level. In addition, in terms of growth—measured by current year sales minus last year sales divided
by last year’s sales—the difference between affiliated and unaffiliated firms is statistically significant
at 5%. This difference explains the advantages of economies of scale and scope for group-member
firms. Moreover, the difference in the total debt between group-affiliated and unaffiliated firms
is also analyzed, with the debt level in relation to total assets higher in unaffiliated firms than in
group-affiliated firms. The overall results reveal that higher profitability, a larger size, and a better
solvency position are important determinants of business group affiliation.
Table 2. Comparison of the statistics of the key variables.
Variables Entire Sample(n = 284)
Affiliated Firms
(n = 143)
Standalone Firms
(n = 141) t-Statistics
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
ROA 3.347 9.707 5.008 9.488 1.663 9.642 −8.335 ***
Tobin’s Q 3.802 3.605 4.132 3.777 3.467 3.391 −4.411 ***
SIZE 14.339 2.541 14.947 2.700 13.723 2.204 −11.824 ***
SGRW 0.094 0.285 0.109 0.270 0.078 0.299 −2.598 **
LEV 0.724 0.848 0.612 0.576 0.838 1.043 6.397 ***
Source: authors’ own estimations. *** significance at the 1% Level, ** significance at the 5% Level.
4.2. Correlation Analysis
Previous studies have provided empirical evidence that group affiliation improves member
firms’ performance [9]. Moreover, several studies have provided a positive correlation between group
affiliation and accounting performance and the stock market performance of group-member firms [59].
In this study, the correlation between group affiliation and accounting performance and stock market
performance is statistically significant at 5%.
Therefore, positive correlations with both performance measures support the first hypothesis that
group affiliation positively affects member firms’ performance when compared to standalone firms.
Moreover, the correlation coefficient between group affiliation and the size of firms is 0.24, suggesting a
moderate correlation between them (See Table 3). However, a negative correlation is observed between
total debt and accounting performance and stock market performance measures. This suggests that an
increasing level of debt decreases the financial performance and value of firms.
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Table 3. Results of the pairwise correlation matrix of Return on Assets (ROA).
DGroup ROA Tobin’s Q Size Sales Growth Leverage
DGroup 1
ROA 0.1723 * 1
Tobin’s Q 0.0922 * 0.2999 * 1
Size 0.2409 * 0.1962 * 0.1097 * 1
Sales Growth 0.0545 * 0.3202 * 0.0314 * 0.1044 * 1
Leverage −0.1844 * −0.3744 * −0.1084 * −0.0538 * −0.0838 * 1
Source: authors’ own estimations. * Significance at the 5% Level.
4.3. Regression Analysis
This section presents the results of regression analysis calculated by using pooled OLS regression,
and the importance of group affiliation in terms of financial performance. Taking group affiliation as
the main variable, the regression is performed between group affiliation and performance measures
with and without considering control variables. Table 4 reports the results of baseline models 1 and
2 taking ROA and Tobin’s Q as dependent variables. The results of the first hypothesis, regarding
whether firms affiliated with business groups have higher accounting and stock market performance
than standalone firms, are reported in columns (1) and (3) of Table 4.
Table 4. Regression results of Equations (1) and (2).
Variable
ROA Tobin’s Q
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DGroup 3.345 ***(8.34)
2.062 ***
(5.30)
0.193 ***
(5.11)
0.139 ***
(3.82)
SIZE 0.386 ***(5.02)
0.047 ***
(6.59)
SGRW 9.558 ***(14.07)
0.009
(0.35)
LEV −1.748 ***(−7.83)
−0.201 ***
(−9.52)
DInd Yes Yes
DYear Yes Yes
Intercept 1.663 ***(5.84)
−2.233
(−0.91)
0.900 ***
(33.58)
0.138
(1.25)
Companies 284 284 284 284
Observations 2272 2272 2272 2272
Adj. R2 0.0293 0.1861 0.011 0.1552
F-Value 69.48 *** 31.54 *** 26.12 *** 30.81 ***
Breusch-Pagan (BP) test 0.29 0.04 0.894 0.139
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 1.00 1.92 1.00 1.42
Shapiro-Wilk (SW) test 0.195 0.132 0.110 0.212
Source: authors’ own estimations. t-values are reported in parentheses. *** significance at the 1% Level.
As is shown in columns (2) and (4) of Table 4 the results are reported with control variables.
The results support the first hypothesis (H1) regarding the fact that group affiliation improves the firm
performance of group-member firms. As shown in columns (1) and (3) of Table 3, for accounting and
stock market performance measures, the effect of group affiliation is statistically significant (p < 0.01)
and positive. The results indicate that group affiliation has a statistically significant positive influence
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on firm profitability (3.345, t-value 8.34) and market performance (0.193, t-value 5.11). In addition,
the results of group affiliation with control variables are also statistically significant. As shown in
columns (2) and (4) of Table 4, the regression results with control variables support the first hypothesis
(H1), that the coefficient of group affiliation has a positive effect on the accounting performance (2.062,
t-value 5.30) and market performance of firms (0.139, t-value 3.82).
The results of control variables are also significant. Size has a statistically significant positive
effect on the profitability (0.386, t-value 5.02) and market performance of the firm (0.047, t-value 6.59).
Therefore, we can conclude that the size of a firm matters for its financial performance. Earlier, Lang,
Ofek, and Stulz [60] reported the positive effect of growth on firm value. Therefore, it was expected
that sales growth and size are positively associated with the value of the firm. The sales growth
coefficient is statistically significant in the case of accounting based performance (9.558, t-value 14.07),
but insignificant in the case of market based performance. Thus, it is implied that sales growth
contributes positively to the profitability of firms, as is evidenced by the positive coefficient of the
sales growth variable. Amongst other control variables, the coefficient of leverage has a statistically
significant negative effect on the financial performance of firms. The results suggest that as debt ratio
increases, the performance of the firm decreases.
We considered that the positive affect of group affiliation on member firms’ financial performance
is derived from different channels, such as internal capital markets, parent office globalization,
marketing channels, and professional human resources. We might attribute our findings to the
fact that external markets have been relatively less sophisticated in Pakistan. In order to avoid the
constraints on arm-length lending, business groups are responsible for providing access to capital
and obtaining funded through internal capital markets for investment in high-yielding opportunities.
Moreover, the bond market is not mature in Pakistan due to high administration costs, and a lack
of technological development, transparency, and liquidity; and the expectations of inflation and the
regular devaluation of PKR currency have hindered foreign investment. Thus, the only source for debt
financing is bank loans. It is important to mention that almost every large business group in Pakistan
has its own bank, that is, it is able to arrange loans and bank guarantees. Hence, affiliated financial
institutions, besides providing internal capital markets, create an advantage over external capital
markets for group firms in the form of loan guarantees, low interest rates, and almost non-existent
protective covenants. This mechanism of cross-subsidies improves the overall financial performance
of group-member firms.
Another interesting factor of Pakistani business groups is that they have parent offices outside
Pakistan. These parent offices facilitate in increasing export sales and investment and coordinate
activities relating to the adoption of modern technology, as there is no government support for
technology upgrading and research and development. Therefore, in collaboration with multinational
firms they are able to use modern technology to increase the productivity of their group-affiliated
firms. Considering the linkages with the international market, business groups provide a baseline
for international exposure for member firms, including the access to international markets so that
they can learn about and capitalize on market opportunities. Standalone firms cannot easily access
these knowledge-based advantages. Therefore, group membership supports member firms in their
transactions with international clients in foreign markets and attracts clients from a wider range of
foreign markets than is the case with standalone firms.
In Pakistan, business groups promote group-wide advertising, which focuses on the overall image
of a business group rather than highlighting an individual member firm. As a result, group-wide
advertising also creates economies of scale and scope. An example of this is the Sitara Group’s
advertising. After the advertisement of each affiliate, there is a message from the Sitara group of
companies, first emphasizing an individual member firm and then promoting the overall image of
the business group. This message promotes the idea that the quality of their products is excellent.
In addition, Pakistan is amongst the top exporters of textiles around the globe, which assists in the
market positioning of the Sitara brand name in different industries such as textiles, chemical products,
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and energy. Similarly, the Hundai Group’s advertising highlights the idea that the manufacturer
operates from ‘from chip to ship’. Chang and Hong [24] found that group investment in advertising
and R&D activities contribute to the economic performance of group-member firms.
Interestingly, the owners of business groups send their children abroad for higher education,
preferably to English speaking countries such as UK, USA, Australia, and Canada. After completion of
their education, they join the business group as a manager. Then, after five-years they are appointed as
directors of different group-affiliated firms and work as interlocking directors. Eventually, they emerge
as a professional human resource for business groups. Thus, from a human perspective, framing a
sound internal management and control system is also critical for business groups in cases where the
number of professional managers in the market is limited. As well as assisting in control, interlocking
directors encourage member firms to share resources and the flow of information, which ultimately
influences their performance in the group.
Therefore, interlocking directorates work as a tool to align objectives between the parent firm and
group-member firms. Moreover, business groups have the capacity to appoint government officials as
directors on their boards to support member firms in dealing comfortably with legal, monitoring, and
enforcement issues. This indicates that business groups are capable of dealing with the voids prevalent
in product, capital, and labor markets.
Note: the table above shows the results of baseline (Equations (1) and (2)) models using pooled
regression. The sample period is from 2008 to 2015. There are two dependent variables, the first of
which is the accounting based performance measure return on assets (ROA). This variable measures
earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. The second dependent variable is a stock
market based performance measure, Tobin’s Q, measuring the market value of equity plus the book
value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. The independent variables are Group dummies
(DGroup), size of firms (SIZE), sales growth (SGRW), leverage (LEV), industry, and time dummies.
DGroup is a dummy variable, where 1 denotes that a firm is affiliated with a business group and
zero that it is not. Size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Sales growth is measured
by current year sales minus last year sales divided by last year sales. Leverage is measured by total
liabilities divided by total assets. DInd shows the industry dummies at a two-digit level of SIC.
DYear substitutes the year dummies between 2008 and 2015.
(BP-test): the Breusch and Pagan test is used to check heteroscedasticity in the linear regression
models [61]. The VIF-test checks the multicollinearity in the independent variables, expressed as the
variance inflation factor (VIF). Five considers a two-digit critical value of VIF. The p-values of the
Shapiro-Wilk normality test offer standard tools for detecting any violation of standard regression
assumptions. Each of the residuals has a normal distribution.
Note: (BP-test): the Breusch and Pagan test is used to check heteroscedasticity in the linear
regression models [61]. The VIF-test checks the multicollinearity in the independent variables,
expressed as the variance inflation factor (VIF). Five considers a two-digit critical value of VIF.
The p-values of the Shapiro-Wilk normality test offer standard tools for detecting the violation of
standard regression assumptions. Each of the residuals has a normal distribution at the 5% level.
In order to explore the possible interaction effects, the size, leverage, and sales growth variables
are interacted with the main variable under examination, that is, group affiliation. In Table 5, the
interaction DGroup × SIZE is investigated, to analyze its influence on the financial performance of
firms. As shown in columns (5) and (8) of Table 5 the coefficient of the interaction term between group
dummy and size is positive and statistically significant (ROA β = 0.167, t-value 7.06, Tobin’s Q β = 0.223,
t-value 10.77). The results support the second hypothesis, namely, that the relationship between group
membership and affiliates is positively moderated by the size of firms. Thus, the results indicate that
large firms receive more advantages from group membership, such as easy access to external capital
markets and greater economies of scale and scope.
Claessens et al. [41] used a sample of 2000 firms from nine East Asian economies to empirically
analyze the interaction effect of group affiliation and size on the value of firms. However, the results
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of the interaction terms between group affiliation and size were statistically insignificant. Recently,
other researchers have also applied the interaction effect between group affiliation and size to firm
value [42] and reported that the interaction term has a statistically significant and positive influence on
firm value.
In Table 5, to test hypothesis 3, the interaction between group affiliation and leverage (DGroup× LEV)
is introduced. In line with our expectations, in columns (6) and (9) the coefficient of the interaction
term between group dummy and leverage is negative and statistically significant for accounting
(ROA β = −2.512, t-value −4.46.) and stock market measures of performance (Tobin’s Q β = −0.212,
t-value −4.54). It is implied that a high debt ratio negatively affects and lowers the performance
of affiliated firms. In other words, a one unit increase in firms’ leverage tends to decrease firms’
profitability performance, and if there are two examined firms the affiliated firm has a better
performance than the non-affiliated one. Hypothesis 3 is supported.
Table 5. Regression Results of Equations (1) and (2) with Using Interactive Variables.
Variable
ROA Tobin’s Q
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
DGroup×
SIZE
0.167 *** 0.223 ***
(7.06) (10.77)
DGroup×
LEV
−2.512 ** −0.212 ***
(−4.46) (−4.54)
DGroup×
SGRW
8.705 ** 0.186 **
(9.36) (2.08)
SIZE
1.397 *** 0.952 *** 0.044 *** 0.039 ***
(11.62) (8.40) (6.36) *** (3.88)
SGRW
9.097 *** 9.612 *** 0.151 ** 0.132 **
(14.06) (14.1) (2.58) (2.16)
LEV
−9.831 *** −9.890 *** −0.112 ** −0.176 ***
(−17.36) (−17.19) (−2.18) (−9.49)
DInd Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DYear Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 6.221 ** −14.379 *** −4.986 * 2.344 *** 0.785 *** 0.140
(2.85) (−5.17) (−1.83) (10.70) (6.56) (0.94)
Companies 284 284 284 284 284 284
Observations 2272 2272 2272 2272 2272 2272
Adj. R2 0.259 0.179 0.236 0.125 0.237 0.206
F-Value 50.62 *** 32.02 *** 44.97 *** 22.72 *** 45.23 *** 37.90 ***
Breusch-Pagan
(BP) test 0.13 1.48 1.82 0.065 0.20 0.15
Variance
Inflation
Factor (VIF)
1.82 2.43 1.91 1.54 1.88 1.43
Shapiro-Wilk
(SW) test 0.096 0.153 0.163 0.112 0.193 0.221
Source: authors’ own estimations. t-values are reported in parentheses. *** significance at the 1% Level,
** significance at the 5% Level, * significant at the 10% Level.
In order to test hypothesis 4, the interaction between group affiliation and sales growth (DGroup
× SGRW) is also shown. Columns 7 and 10 present the results of DGroup × SGRW. The coefficient
of the interactive term is positive and statistically significant (ROA β = 8.705, t-value 9.36, Tobin’s Q
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β = 0.186, t-value 2.08). Hypothesis 4 is also supported. The interaction between group affiliation
and firm characteristics, such as the size of the firm, sales growth, and capital structure, is statistically
significant for performance measures. Sales growth and the size of the group-affiliated firms have a
greater influence on the financial performance of firms than they do with non-affiliated firms.
The multi-collinearity amongst the independent (interaction and other financial) variables are
tested by the variance inflation factor (VIF) in each case and their maximum individual values are
reported in Table 5. The VIF values for each regression coefficient ranged from a low of 1.00 to a high
of 2.43, and indicated that the collinearity problem is controlled, in which one predictor variable in
a multiple regression model can be linearly predicted from the others with a substantial degree of
accuracy. Hence, there is no particularly collinearity amongst the independent interaction and other
control variables. This suggests that the VIF values are at acceptable levels [62], and in this case there
is no need for centering such interaction models [63]. All of them are included in the final model.
The Breusch and Pagan tests are also applied in order to test the existence of heteroscedasticity. In the
present study, the χ2 values suggest that the statistics are at an acceptable level (p > 0.05) and there is
no heteroscedasticity.
5. Discussion
Researchers have offered different views of business groups, portraying them as parasites, villains,
and anachronisms, or as paragons, heroes, and avatars. Our study findings provide compelling
evidence of a direct positive link between group membership and firms’ financial performance.
In addition, this relationship is found to be strongly moderated by firm specific factors such as size,
leverage, and sales growth. In line with our expectations as stated in H1, we find that firms affiliated
with business groups are more profitable than standalone firms. The findings are consistent with the
earlier studies. For example, Chang and Choi [13] reported a positive effect of group affiliation on
the performance of chaebol firms. Moreover, Chittoor, Kale, and Puranam [64] and Manikandan and
Ramachandran [65] also found that group-member firms have a better accounting and stock market
performance. In the context of an emerging economy, such as Pakistan, group-affiliated firms perform
better financially than standalone firms do.
Specifically, our study contributes to the business group literature in three ways. Firstly, the
financial performance of group-affiliated and standalone firms are investigated to show the influence
of group membership on accounting and stock market measures. The results of our study show that
the performance outcome of business group affiliation is contingent upon various firm characteristics,
such as size, leverage, and sale growth. Thus we stress the need to study the impact of group affiliation
in the presence of other factors that may shape the outcomes of business affiliation.
Secondly, business groups support member firms in avoiding the severe institutional voids
prevalent in the emerging economy of Pakistan. The free flow of capital, sharing intangible resources
(such as R&D and advertising), and interlocking directors within group member firms generate
considerable economies of scale and scope. An interesting observation is that most of the group
member firms are more mature and large, as these member firms have been operating since the
independence of Pakistan. Importantly, they have their own financial and technical resources.
Lastly, we found that standalone firms are more locally oriented and less diversified than their
group affiliated counterparts, which explains their survival and the performance discount they incur.
Business groups collaborate in the form of international joint ventures which benefit member firms by
offering access to new markets and advanced technology, increased capacity, and the sharing of risks.
In the case of Pakistan, standalone firms do not perform on a par with their group affiliated peers.
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6. Conclusions
This research paper seeks to provide empirical evidence on the effect of group membership on the
performance of firms in Pakistan. By using a sample of 284 Pakistani firms as the research sample, this
study suggests that group membership is beneficial for member firms. Moreover, the benefits of group
membership are linked to the size of business-group firms. In the case of large group member firms,
the effect of business group membership is more influential than it is with small group member firms.
This study compares the profitability of group-member firms with standalone firms using an
independent sample t-test for mean differences. The results support the hypothesis that group-affiliated
firms are more profitable compared to standalone firms. Moreover, the results of interaction terms
are also statistically significant, which implies that the size and sales growth of group firms positively
contribute to the financial performance of firms.
Thus, the findings of the study suggest two important explanations. First, like most developing
economies, business groups are able to overcome the inefficiencies related to emerging markets, such as
imperfections in the markets regarding product, capital, and labor [63]. Second, in emerging economies,
poor judicial systems lead to low trust, making personal ties more important and trustworthy than
trust institutions [66].
The results of this study have vitally important implications for practitioners—managers,
macroeconomic policymakers, academicians and theorists. Specifically, weak governance tends to
discourage private sector investment and reduce economic efficiency. Importantly, governance issues
are significantly related to institutional voids. These institutional voids provide opportunities to groups
to benefit and create advantages over standalone firms. These advantages are created through sharing
financial resources and intangible resources (R&D, advertising), appointing interlocking directors, and
collaborating with multinational firms. Thus, these measures enable group-affiliated firms to respond
positively to institutional voids by making themselves a part of trustworthy networks in order to
reduce financial risks.
Nevertheless, Chari and David [53] claimed that a negative relationship between pro-market
reforms and the sustainability of superior profits exists in an emerging economy. The decline in
the sustainability of superior profits also shows that pro-market reforms bring significant threats
in addition to offering various opportunities, such as a greater availability of production factors
and greater freedom to enter and operate businesses. The empirical results also supported a
significant difference in the superior and sustainable economic performance among firms in developed
and developing countries [67]. Increasing evidence of climate change is forcing businesses to
play an active role in reducing sustainability burdens and preserving their resources for future
generations [68]. The greater investment in research and development (R&D) [69] and in marketing
& advertising are firm-level resources [70] that can provide a measure of protection against the
destruction in the sustainability of superior profits which is associated with pro-market reforms in
such emerging economies.
Like other research studies, this study has its limitations. It is an empirical study, which is
based on a single country framework of Pakistan. Thus, it would be valuable to extend this study by
employing data from both financial and non-financial firms and, accordingly, comparing Pakistan
with other emerging economies, such as India and Bangladesh, particularly because the Pakistani and
Indian economies have very similar features. Therefore, a replication of this study in other emerging
economies may allow these results to be generalized. Besides, the differences between manufacturing
and non-manufacturing business group firms, or the characteristics of high tech companies, could
also be explored [71]. From this perspective, there is a need for improved methods to determine
additional—that is, environmental—risk effects on their financial performance [72]. Furthermore, it
would be important to consider that competition does not only occur among companies, but also
among Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) [73].
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Appendix A
Table A1. Summary Table of the Literature Review.
Author Objective Method Key Findings
Khanna and Palepu
(2000) [15]
To analyze the
performance of
group-affiliated firms
relative to
standalone firms.
Multiple regression
analysis.
Finds that accounting and
stock market measures of firm
performance initially decline
and subsequently increase
once group diversification
exceeds a certain level.
Khanna and Rivkin
(2001) [17]
To examine the effects
of group affiliation
on profitability.
Ordinary least
squares (OLS).
Finds that business group
affiliation affects the economic
performance in 12 of
the markets.
Gunduz and Tatoglu
(2003) [54]
To compare the
performance of
affiliates of diversified
Turkish business
groups with that of
unaffiliated firms.
ANOVA Multiple
regression analysis.
Reports that firms affiliated
with diversified business
groups do not significantly
differ from unaffiliated firms
in terms of accounting and
stock market measures
of performance.
Chu (2004) [39]
To investigate the
influence of group
affiliation on
performance of firms.
Multiple regression
analysis.
Finds a U-shape relationship
between group affiliation and
profitability in
emerging economies.
Khanna and Yafeh
(2005) [2]
To examine whether
business groups
facilitate mutual
insurance among
group-affiliated firms.
Weighted least
square (WLS)
regression is used
for the analysis.
Finds substantial evidence of
risk sharing by Japanese,
Korean, and Thai groups, but
little evidence of it elsewhere.
Claessens et al.
(2006) [41]
To investigate the
benefits and costs of
group affiliation.
Multiple regression
analysis.
Finds that mature and
slow-growing firms with
ownership structures gain
more from group affiliation,
while young and high-growth
firms lose more.
Zattoni et al. (2009) [32]
To analyze how
business group
affiliation affects
performance in India
in the post-reform era
i.e., from 1990 to 2006.
Applied SAS
procedure
(Time-series and
cross-section
regression) with
variance
component model.
Finds (1) benefits of business
group affiliation are evident in
the early phase of institutional
transition (2) older
group-affiliated firms are
better able to cope with
institutional transition than
younger group-affiliated firms.
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Table A1. Cont.
Author Objective Method Key Findings
Carney et al. (2011) [26]
To study business
group affiliation and
performance.
Weighted least
squares (WLS).
Finds that affiliates perform
better in contexts with
underdeveloped financial and
labor markets.
He et al. (2013) [16]
To discover whether
group-affiliated firms
tend to outperform
standalone firms.
Fixed effect OLS
regression
Finds that business group
membership has no effect on
accounting performance
Elango et al. (2016) [9]
To study the impact of
specific business group
characteristics on the
performance of
group-affiliated firms.
Hierarchical linear
models (HLM).
Finds (1) membership in a
group contributes 6% of the
performance variation of
affiliated firms; (2) the
importance of the business
group to performance varies
with the extent of group
diversification, age and size.
Table A2. Sample Distribution across Industries.
Industry Two-Digit SIC Code Numberof Firms
Percentage of
Entire Sample
Food & Tobacco 1, 2, 9, 20, 21, 54 35 12
Basic Industries including Petroleum 10, 12, 13, 14, 24, 26, 28, 29, 33 74 26
Construction 15, 16, 17, 32, 52 20 7
Textile & Trade 22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59 129 45
Consumer Durables 25, 30, 36, 37, 39, 50, 55, 57, 34, 35, 38 7 3
Transportation 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47 17 6
Services 72, 73 75, 76, 80, 82, 87, 89 2 1
Others No specific SIC code 0 0
Entire Sample 284 100
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